Mostrar mensagens com a etiqueta BANIF. Mostrar todas as mensagens
Mostrar mensagens com a etiqueta BANIF. Mostrar todas as mensagens

sábado, 19 de janeiro de 2013

0 Banif: Onde é que já vimos isto?

Banqueiros e Governo dizem que o Banif não é o novo BPN. Mas as semelhanças estão à vista: o banco madeirense serviu de instrumento para financiar o regime de Jardim, enquanto acolhia ex-governantes do PSD, mas também do PS. Veja aqui as ligações entre políticos e o banco que acaba de ser salvo com o dinheiro dos contribuintes.


O Banco Internacional do Funchal foi salvo com dinheiros públicos, mas o Governo preferiu comunicar a decisão à Comissão de Mercado e Valores Mobiliários (CMVM) quando faltavam poucas horas para as primeiras badaladas do ano novo. Foi na tarde de 31 de dezembro que Vítor Gaspar notificou a CMVM que o Estado iria injetar 1.100 milhões de euros no capital do banco que é propriedade das herdeiras do milionário madeirense Horácio Roque, o fundador do banco falecido em 2010. A somar a isto, há mais 1.150 milhões em garantias estatais ao Banif, o que faz aumentar a fatura para os contribuintes para 2.250 milhões, em caso de incumprimento do banco.
Esta quinta-feira, os acionistas do Banif aprovaram o plano de recapitalização do banco agora liderado por Luís Amado e Jorge Tomé. O ex-ministro da Defesa e dos Negócios Estrangeiros de José Sócrates e o ex-administrador da Caixa Geral de Depósitos foram os nomes que tiveram o aval do Banco de Portugal, quando uma das herdeiras de Horário Roque procurou a ajuda do Estado para salvar o banco, no meio de uma batalha pela posse da herança milionária.
Com esta operação, os atuais acionistas que levaram o banco à situação difícil em que se encontrava, recusam-se a entrar com mais de 100 milhões de euros no capital do seu próprio banco, deixando para os contribuintes a tarefa de limpar as "imparidades" nas contas do banco. O aumento de capital do Banif previsto para junho, no valor de 450 milhões de euros, deverá ser subscrito por outros bancos intervencionados pelo Estado, como o BCP e o BPI.
Banif: um banco de Jardim, mas não só
A história do Banif começa antes da sua fundação, com a Caixa Económica do Funchal, controlada por figuras próximas do independentismo da Flama e usada como instrumento do Governo Regional a seguir ao 25 de abril. A associação mutualista que controlava a Caixa viu-se obrigada a desfazer-se da instituição em meados da década de 90, arrasada por um passivo gigante e pelo crédito mal-parado. Os compradores foram Horário Roque e o amigo e sócio de negócios sul-africanos, Joe Berardo, mais tarde agraciados como Comendadores da República. Quem representou os associados na venda da Caixa aos novos investidores foi Abdool Vakil, o ex-presidente do Banco Efisa (do grupo BPN) que mais tarde sucederia a Oliveira e Costa à frente do BPN, quando este abdicou do cargo alegando problemas de saúde.
A seguir à compra, Horácio Roque viria em seguida a reforçar a sua presença no capital, adquirindo a posição de Berardo e partilhando a maioria das ações com a Auto-Industrial, uma empresa do ramo automóvel, no qual o banco se especializou nos primeiros anos.
Admirador confesso de Alberto João Jardim, Horácio Roque manteve o banco sempre na órbita do PSD/Madeira e muitos ainda se lembram do banco adiantar salários aos funcionários públicos madeirenses, quando os cofres de Jardim estavam vazios. E o dinheiro que pagou muitas despesas da máquina eleitoral do PSD/Madeira também circulou através do banco que conta nos seus órgãos sociais com figuras de topo do regime de Alberto João Jardim, incluindo dois nomes apontados à sua sucessão: Miguel de Sousa e Paulo Freitas, ambos ex-gvernantes regionais e atuais vice-presidentes do Parlamento madeirense. O primeiro preside à Assembleia Geral do banco e o segundo tem lugar no Conselho Superior Corporativo do Banif, o órgão que substituiu o Conselho Consultivo da instituição.
Também Tranquada Gomes, o deputado que foi o quarto candidato na lista do PSD nas últimas regionais, esteve mais de uma década no Conselho Fiscal e na Assembleia Geral do banco. O escritório de advogados que partilha com o também deputado laranja Coito Pita foi a morada registada como sede do banco Efisa no offshore da Madeira. O cargo de Tranquada Gomes na AG do Banif passou para outro companheiro de bancada, João da Silva Santos, que também é administrador da cimenteira da Região.
Mas o Banif também acolheu algumas figuras da política nacional nos seus órgãos, como Ângelo Correia. A sua Fomentinvest foi ainda parceira do banco em 2010, a trazer para Portugal o negócio da especulação no mercado de carbono, da compra e venda de créditos de poluição, nomeadamente com a russa Gazprom. Também António Nogueira Leite, coordenador da moção que levou Passos Coelho a ganhar o Congresso do PSD, sendo nomeado para a Caixa Geral de Depósitos a seguir às eleições legislativas, passou cinco anos no Conselho Consultivo do Banif. As ligações do banco a figuras do atual Governo também são visíveis no caso de Diogo da Silveira, um dos sócios de Carlos Moedas na Schilling Capital Partners, um fundo de especulação na bolsa e seguros, que pertence à administração do Banif desde 2007.
Mais cavaquistas a dar cartas na banca
Já se sabia que os governos de Cavaco Silva deram a conhecer ao mundo pessoas com vontade de dar cartas na finança, como ficou à vista com o BPN, cujo buraco de 7 mil milhões de euros (na última avaliação) está a ser pago pelos contribuintes sem que se conheçam consequências para o património dos que ganharam com desfalques. Olhando para os atuais e antigos detentores de cargos no Banif, encontramos mais ex-governantes dos dez anos de cavaquismo.
Jorge Oliveira Godinho foi secretário de Estado das Pescas de Cavaco durante seis anos e a seguir passou uma década na administração da EDP até entrar em 2009 no Conselho Consultivo do Banif Investimento. Neto da Silva, que diz ser o fundador da Loja Mozart, o grupo maçónico que integrava o atual líder parlamentar laranja Luís Montenegro e outras figuras ligadas ao PSD, aos serviços secretos e à empresa Ongoing, ocupa hoje um lugar no Conselho Nacional do PSD, ao mesmo tempo que fiscaliza as contas do Banif como vogal do Conselho Fiscal. Foi secretário de Estado do Comércio Externo de Cavaco Silva. A lista de governantes de Cavaco no Banif fica completa com Manuel Carvalho Fernandes, que foi secretário de Estado do Tesouro e trabalhava de perto com Oliveira e Costa, seu colega responsável pelos assuntos fiscais. Carvalho Fernandes viria a demitir-se na sequência do escândalo da fracassada OPV de sete empresas da Sonae. Tanto ele como o seu ministro, Miguel Cadilhe, vinham do BPA, um dos grandes clientes da Sonae e o banco por trás da operação bolsista. Hoje é acionista de empresas do grupo Banif e administrador do banco.
O próprio Cavaco Silva também quis estar associado ao crescimento do Banif na última década. Em janeiro de 2003 participou na conferência que assinalava os 15 anos do banco, ao lado de Horácio Roque e Alberto João Jardim. E dois anos mais tarde, um mês antes de anunciar a sua candidatura às eleições presidenciais, o antigo primeiro-ministro deslocou-se a Londres para participar enquanto convidado de honra no jantar que assinalou a abertura de um escritório do Banif Investimentos. A notícia do jantar londrino, no qual Alberto João Jardim foi o grande ausente, ainda aparece no site do banco. "Segundo foi possível apurar, o presidente do Governo Regional foi convidado directamente por Horácio Roque - o presidente do Grupo BANIF - só que o facto de Jardim estar envolvido nas mais de sessenta inaugurações e igual número de festas partidárias impedem a sua saída da Região", relatava o Diário de Notícias da Madeira.
O perfume da rosa chega à Madeira
Ao contrário do BPN, os donos do Banif procuraram integrar todo o bloco central nos seus órgãos sociais, convidando ex-governantes do PS para cargos no banco. Muito antes de Luís Amado assumir a presidência do banco em tempo de crise, a Global Seguros - seguradora do grupo - contratou para seu administrador José Lamego, ex-secretário de Estado socialista, entre 2001 e 2005. Curiosamente, foi nesse intervalo de tempo que Lamego foi nomeado para ajudar a redigir a Constituição aprovada após a ocupação norte-americana no Iraque. Depois da experiência acumulada no Funchal e em Bagdade, Lamego transferiu-se para o grupo BPN, com um cargo no banco Efisa.
A Global Seguros foi a empresa escolhida para dar emprego a figuras de peso do PS como Vera Jardim, ex-ministro da Justiça e atual membro da Comissão Política socialista, que presidiu à AG da seguradora entre 2009 e 2010. O seu colega no governo de Guterres com a pasta da Defesa, Júlio Castro Caldas, fez parte do conselho geral e de supervisão da Global Seguros pelo menos entre 2007 e 2010.

sábado, 5 de janeiro de 2013

0 Banif - A trágica semelhança

Começámos o ano com a notícia de que boa parte dos cortes e impostos da sobre-austeridade de 2013 – 1.100 milhões de Euros – vai ser canalizada para salvar mais um banco. Desta vez o BANIF, um banco pequeno pelos habituais critérios de medição, pouco maior que o BPN no ano em que foi nacionalizado. Artigo de João Neves, publicado em IAC.


Este montante, que representa mais um aumento na dívida pública portuguesa, destina-se a reforçar o capital do BANIF para que este cumpra o rácio entre capital e activos de 10%, um rácio que mede a proporção de capital investido pelos accionistas do banco para financiar a sua actividade, nomeadamente a de conceder crédito.
Este rácio de 10% resulta dos compromissos assumidos pelo governo português no memorando com a troika e tinha de ser atingido em 2012, o que poderá explicar a razão para o anúncio desta medida mesmo no final do ano.
Em traços gerais, o plano de capitalização anunciado prevê a compra de acções pelo estado de 700 milhões de Euros, um empréstimo sob a forma de obrigações (convertíveis em acções) de 400 milhões de Euros (perfazendo os 1.100 milhões de Euros de fundos públicos) aos quais se juntarão, em Junho deste ano,  450 milhões de Euros de accionistas privados.
Estas medidas não são novas. Outros bancos privados – o BPI e o BCP – já beneficiaram destas injeções de capital público. A grande diferença – e trágica semelhança com o caso do BPN – é que estes dois bancos têm mesmo uma importância relevante no sistema bancário português, ao passo que o BANIF é um banco de pequena dimensão. O próximo gráfico compara o montante da ajuda concedida com a dimensão (medida pelo activo):

A partir dos balanços consolidados dos bancos em Junho 2012. Fonte APB.
O montante do socorro ao BANIF é ainda mais questionável se verificarmos que, em Junho de 2012, o banco anunciava que o rácio de capital prudencial era de 8.4% e que o seu capital total seria de 822 milhões de Euros. Ou seja, um banco que não andaria muito longe de alcançar o objectivo fixado pela troika precisa de duplicar o seu capital para fechar o pequeno intervalo que vai de 8.4% para 10%.  O que é que se passou nos últimos seis meses? Ou pior, o que é que já se tinha passado mas não estava reflectido nas contas publicadas?
Para além disto, o Estado já apoiou o BANIF garantindo empréstimos actualmente no montante de 1.150 milhões de Euros. Ou seja, se o banco falir o Estado arriscou por nós 2.250 milhões de euros repartidos entre capital investido (os 1.100 milhões agora anunciados) e empréstimos garantidos (1.150 milhões).
As comparações são recorrentes mas necessárias. O dinheiro que está em jogo nesta aposta – é disso que se trata – cobriria mais de metade dos cortes com o estado social que nos vão anunciar em breve; chegaria, por exemplo, para pagar o salário anual médio em Portugal a 185.000 pessoas.
Em troca dos cortes continuamos a ter o mesmo: perguntas sem resposta. Que operações fez o banco para destruir quase por completo a sua base de capital? Quem contraiu empréstimos e não os vai pagar? Quantos bancos mais estão nestas circunstâncias? Até quando vão dinheiros públicos sanar dívidas privadas?
A troika reservou 12.000 milhões de Euros para operações como esta. Hoje estão gastos 5.600 milhões (com o BPI, o BCP e agora o BANIF). O direito de conhecer a verdadeira dimensão dos problemas bancários é flagrante. O dever de a desvendar é inevitável.

quarta-feira, 2 de janeiro de 2013

0 Passivo do Banif de 14.000.000.000 (14 BILIÕES), isto faz do BPN uma brincadeira de crianças


 Para começar é só mais um BPN para entrar 2013 com o pé esquerdo,
Descupem lá, visto que não é BPN, é BANIF

Reparem bem no Passivo de 14.000.000.000 (14 BILIÕES), isto faz do BPN uma brincadeira de crianças

Importa salintar que tem exposição á dívida imobiliária espanhola atravéz do Banca Pueyo, SA, Inmobiliaria Vegas Altas (Espanha) e dos EUA através de Banif Finance (USA) Corp. (crédito imobiliário – EUA), Banif Financial Services, Inc. (Miami), Banif Securities, Inc. (corretagem - EUA),...
---------------
ainda falta compilar e criar tabelas relativas a 20 pags do relatório onde se lê isto e muito mais: "
d) DESCRIÇÃO DO MODO DE CAPITALIZAÇÃO

Na prossecução do objectivo de reforçar a sua solvabilidade, tendo em conta a necessidade de cumprir os rácios mínimos de capital estabelecidos pelo Banco de Portugal e a necessidade de criar uma margem prudencial para lidar com um ambiente operacional extremamente difícil, o Grupo Banif irá participar no programa de recapitalização das instituições de crédito em Portugal através da realização de investimento público.

No caso do Grupo Banif, a recapitalização, realizada após a conversão em definitivo do registo da fusão da Banif SGPS, SA, no Banif SA, será no montante global de até €1.400 milhões, nas seguintes duas fases e com a seguinte estrutura:(...)
No que concerne às remanescentes rubricas de imparidade em balanço, importa destacar que, em 2011, o Banco registou uma imparidade de €69,9 milhões em títulos, enquanto a imparidade registada em operações de titularização ascendeu a €66 milhões em 2011, montante que compara com €25 milhões registados em 2010 e com €16 milhões em 2009. A imparidade registada ao nível dos instrumentos de capital, por sua vez, evidenciou uma tendência crescente ao longo dos períodos, cifrando-se em €311 milhares em 2009, €544 milhares em 2010 e €3 milhões em 2011"
(...pagina 90)
A necessidade de capitalização do Grupo Banif é sobretudo explicada pela conjugação dos seguintes factores: i) deterioração acentuada da economia portuguesa, que teve um impacto muito negativo na actividade e rendibilidade dos bancos; ii) enquadramento regulamentar que, ao longo de 2011, se tornou muito exigente e resultou na necessidade de cumprir um rácio Core Tier 1 de 9% e 10% em Dezembro de 2011 e Dezembro de 2012, respectivamente (Aviso 3/2011 do Banco de Portugal), iii) escassez de financiamento de mercado, uma vez que, na sequência da adesão de Portugal ao Programa de Assistência Económica e Financeira (“PAEF”), o recurso a fontes externas de capital continua praticamente vedado a empresas portuguesas e
iv) fracas perspectivas no curto prazo para a economia portuguesa, esperando-se um agravamento do contexto recessivo e deterioração adicional da qualidade de crédito.
depois vai para aqui

http://revoltatotalglobal.blogspot.com/
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Banif Finance, Limited -- Moody's takes actions on three Portuguese banks: BCP, Banif and CGD
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Banco Comercial Portugues zu myNews hinzufügen Was ist das?



Madrid, December 04, 2012 -- Moody's Investors Service has today taken actions on three Portuguese banks. The debt and deposit ratings of Banco Comercial Portugues (BCP) were downgraded by one notch to B1 with a negative outlook. The debt and deposit ratings of Banco Internacional do Funchal S.A. (Banif) were lowered by one notch to B2 from B1, and placed on review with direction uncertain. The debt and deposit ratings of Caixa Geral de Depositos (CGD) were affirmed at Ba3 with a negative outlook.
The actions on the banks' debt and deposit ratings were prompted by Moody's downgrades of their standalone credit assessments (Baseline Credit Assessments, BCA). Moody's has downgraded by three notches each the standalone credit assessments of BCP, Banif and CGD to reflect the expected further deterioration of the banks' risk absorption capacity given the more negative outlook for the Portuguese economy, with GDP forecasts having been revised downwards by Moody's to -3.3% expected for FY2012 and a further contraction of -1.2% for 2013, as opposed to the August forecasts which expected -3.6% for 2012 and -0.3% for 2013.

RATING ACTIONS OVERVIEW

-- Banco Comercial Portugues (BCP): The standalone credit assessment was downgraded to E/caa2 from E+/b2 and the debt and deposit ratings were downgraded to B1/Not Prime from at Ba3/Not Prime. The bank's subordinated debt and preference share ratings were downgraded to Caa3 and C(hyb) respectively. All ratings have a negative outlook.

-- Banco Internacional do Funchal (Banif): The standalone credit assessment was downgraded to E/caa2 from E+/b2 and the debt and deposit ratings were downgraded to B2/Not Prime from B1/Not Prime. The bank's subordinated, junior subordinated debt and preference share ratings were downgraded to Caa3, Ca(hyb) and C(hyb), from B3, Caa1(hyb) and Caa2(hyb) respectively. All ratings except the junior instruments are on review with direction uncertain.

-- Caixa Geral de Depositos (CGD): The standalone credit assessment was downgraded to E/caa1 from E+/b1 and the debt and deposit ratings were affirmed at Ba3/Not Prime. The bank's subordinated, junior subordinated debt and preference share ratings were downgraded to Caa2, Caa3(hyb) and Ca(hyb), from B2, B3(hyb) and Caa1(hyb) respectively. All ratings have a negative outlook.

A full list of affected ratings can be found at this link: http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBC_147923

RATINGS RATIONALE

RATIONALE FOR DOWNGRADES OF STANDALONE CREDIT ASSESSMENTS

Throughout 2012 BCP, Banif and CGD have seen an increased portion of its pre-provision income absorbed by asset impairments. At the same time, the capacity of these banks to generate recurring earnings to offset these rising impairments has been significantly impacted by (i) higher funding costs (particularly of retail deposits), (ii) ongoing balance sheet deleveraging and (iii) increase in non-earning assets. Moody's is concerned that Portugal's prolonged economic recession will exacerbate the intense pressure on the already very weak risk absorption capacity of these three banks.

Moody's acknowledges the improved solvency levels for BCP and CGD following the recapitalization effort made by the Portuguese government in June 2012. Moody's also notes that Banif's current capital shortfall to comply with a regulatory core Tier 1 capital threshold of 10% will be compensated after the targeted public recapitalization materializes, which is expected to take place before year-end 2012. However, the rating agency is concerned that the very negative economic conditions for the Portuguese economy may challenge the achievement of the deleveraging goals contemplated in the recapitalization and funding plans approved by Bank of Portugal and the Troika for the three banks. Furthermore, the expected broader deterioration in profitability and asset quality will pressure the banks' capital base, which increases the likelihood that additional public support may be required to offset for the losses embedded in their balance sheets.

Funding profiles have improved throughout 2012 thanks to deleveraging efforts and resilient deposit bases. However, Moody's considers that additional risks pressuring the three banks' standalone credit assessment is the ongoing lack of access to long-term wholesale funding sources, which have led them to display high reliance on European Central Bank (ECB) funding. Heightened uncertainties on the health of the Portuguese economy as well as on the creditworthiness of the banking system will prevent banks to regain normalized access to private markets in the foreseeable future. In this regard, Moody's expects that BCP, Banif and CGD will remain reliant on ECB support for some time.

Consistent with Moody's definitions, the lower standalone credit assessment reflects the rating agency's view that BCP, Banif and CGD have speculative intrinsic, or standalone, financial strength and are subject to very high credit risk absent any possibility of extraordinary support from a third party or the government.

RATIONALE FOR STANDALONE CREDIT ASSESSMENTS BY BANK

BANCO COMERCIAL PORTUGUES (BCP)

BCP's E/caa2 standalone credit assessment, is a reflection of its very weak risk absorption capacity despite the recent public recapitalization, evidenced by 1) rapidly deteriorating profitability ratios, with a sharp decline in net interest income of 35.6% and a EUR796.3 million net loss reported at end-September 2012; 2) very high reported NPL ratio (credit at risk ratio as per Bank of Portugal's definition) of 13.4% (compared to the system's average of 10%) and 3) Moody's concerns in relation to BCP's exposure to Greece through its 100%-owned subsidiary Millennium Bank S.A (unrated).

BCP was required by the European Banking Authority (EBA) to reach a 9% core tier 1 ratio before end-June 2012. To comply with this regulatory capital threshold, the Portuguese government provided EUR3 billion of capital to BCP in the form of hybrid instruments and the bank made a EUR500 million capital increase subscribed by private investors. At end-September 2012 BCP reported core Tier I ratios of 11.9% (according to Bank of Portugal's definition) and 9.4% (as per EBA definition).

Despite the enhanced capital ratios, Moody's downgrade captures the significant downside risks of BCP's credit fundamentals to the country's very difficult operating environment. Moody's expects the bank's activity in Portugal to remain loss-making during 2013, due to the ongoing increase in non-earning assets and subdued business volumes. In addition, the rating agency cautions that BCP's risk absorption capacity could be further challenged in the event of a more negative scenario for its Greek operations.

BCP's standalone credit assessment has a negative outlook to reflect the bank's vulnerability to a further weakening of its credit profile in light of the very negative outlook for the Portuguese economy.

BANIF

The downgrade of Banif's standalone credit assessment to E/caa2 reflects 1) the bank's rapidly deteriorating financial fundamentals, namely in terms of profitability and asset quality (the bank reported a net loss of EUR61 million and a NPL ratio of 13% at end-June 2012); 2) very modest internal capital generation capacity that has forced them to require public support from the Bank Solvency Support Facility to recapitalize.

Banif has recently undertaken an organizational restructuring as part of the required recapitalization plan, entailing the merger of Banif SGPS -- its former parent -- into Banif, with the latter now acting as head of the group. Moody's notes, however, that the merger is still subject to final registration, which is a prerequisite for Banif to receive public support. In addition, the bank expects to fulfil a drastic deleveraging of its balance sheet over the next five years, which is expected to ease funding requirements and reduce risk weighted assets.

Moody's notes that the review with direction uncertain of Banif's standalone ratings reflects the need of further clarity about the recapitalization plan, which will enable to assess the credit profile of Banif post public capital infusion as well as the impact of other initiatives that may be included in such plan. In addition, during the review period Moody's expects to analyze the impact of the organizational restructuring and also whether targeted improvements in corporate governance can have a material - and tangible - impact on the bank's credit profile. Downward pressure persists on Banif's standalone ratings as the bank will continue to operate under very challenging operating conditions, which will make it very difficult for management to achieve the goals set up in the recapitalization plan.

CAIXA GERAL DE DEPOSITOS (CGD)

The downgrade of CGD's standalone credit assessment to E/caa1 has been prompted by Moody's concerns that the bank's weak credit fundamentals are likely to be further challenged in 2013 in light of our expectations of a prolonged economic recession in Portugal. CGD displays a weak risk absorption capacity principally due to (i) its very modest profitability indicators (the bank reported a net loss of EUR102 million and a decline in net interest income of 15% as of end-September 2012), (ii) deteriorating asset quality (reported credit at risk ratio of 9.2% at end September 2012) and (iii) high direct exposure to Portuguese sovereign risk (almost 2.5x Tier 1 capital).

In downgrading the bank's standalone credit assessment, Moody's has taken into account CGD's recent capital reinforcement in order to comply with EBA's 9% core Tier I capital requirement by end-June 2012. The recapitalization was completed with a EUR900 million issue of hybrid financial instruments and a EUR750 million capital increase, both of which were fully subscribed by the Portuguese State. Despite the benefits of the capital improvement, Moody's notes that CGD displays significant downside risks to the country's negative macroeconomic scenario that are likely to put additional pressure on its capital.

In addition the bank has embarked on a deleveraging plan that encompasses significant divestments in the domestic market that could improve its capital position but may have a negative impact on its already very limited earnings generation capacity.

The outlook on CGD's standalone credit assessment is negative to reflect the above mentioned risks.

RATIONALE FOR DOWNGRADE OF DEBT RATINGS AND SUPPORT ASSUMPTIONS

The one-notch downgrade of BCP's and Banif's senior debt and deposit ratings reflect (i) the further deterioration of their standalone credit profile, as discussed above; and (ii) Moody's assessment of a very high probability of support by the Portuguese government for the banks in case of need.

The debt ratings of CGD were affirmed at Ba3, resulting in four notches of uplift from its standalone credit assessment of caa1, and based on Moody's assessment of a very high probability of support from the Portuguese government as CGD's unique shareholder.

The negative outlook on BCP's and CGD's debt and deposit ratings reflect both the currently negative outlook on the Portuguese government's Ba3 bond rating and the negative outlook on the bank's standalone credit assessment.

The review with direction uncertain of Banif's senior debt and deposit ratings is commensurate with the review status of the bank's standalone credit assessment.

SUBORDINATED DEBT AND HYBRID RATINGS

Moody's has downgraded the senior subordinated debt and hybrid ratings of BCP, Banif and CGD in line with the lowering of their standalone credit assessments. Moody's had previously removed government support assumptions from its ratings of subordinated debt and hybrid instruments of Portuguese banks on 28 March 2012, see "Moody's takes actions on seven Portuguese banks; Outlook negative".

Moody's review for downgrade on the junior instruments of Banif reflects the issuer's very weak credit profile and the increased risk of losses being imposed on these instruments in case of a broader deterioration of the bank's creditworthiness.

WHAT COULD MOVE THE RATING UP/DOWN

Downwards pressure on the banks' ratings might develop if operating conditions worsen beyond Moody's current expectations, i.e. a broader economic recession beyond our current GDP decline forecasts of -3.3% for 2012 and -1.2% for 2013; especially given that this is likely to result in asset-quality and profitability deterioration exceeding Moody's current expectations; and/or if pressures on market-funding intensify.

Upwards pressure on the banks' ratings may arise in case of an improved credit profile resulting from the work-out of asset quality challenges, a recovery of profitability indicators and sustained capitalization levels, as well as normalized access to wholesale funding markets.

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Moody's Consolidated Global Bank Rating Methodology published in June 2012. Please see the Credit Policy page on www.moodys.com for a copy of this methodology.

REGULATORY DISCLOSURES

For ratings issued on a program, series or category/class of debt, this announcement provides relevant regulatory disclosures in relation to each rating of a subsequently issued bond or note of the same series or category/class of debt or pursuant to a program for which the ratings are derived exclusively from existing ratings in accordance with Moody's rating practices. For ratings issued on a support provider, this announcement provides relevant regulatory disclosures in relation to the rating action on the support provider and in relation to each particular rating action for securities that derive their credit ratings from the support provider's credit rating. For provisional ratings, this announcement provides relevant regulatory disclosures in relation to the provisional rating assigned, and in relation to a definitive rating that may be assigned subsequent to the final issuance of the debt, in each case where the transaction structure and terms have not changed prior to the assignment of the definitive rating in a manner that would have affected the rating. For further information please see the ratings tab on the issuer/entity page for the respective issuer on www.moodys.com.

The ratings have been disclosed to the rated entities or their designated agent(s) and issued with no amendment resulting from that disclosure.

Information sources used to prepare each of the ratings are the following: parties involved in the ratings, public information, and confidential and proprietary Moody's Investors Service information.

Moody's considers the quality of information available on the rated entities, obligations or credits satisfactory for the purposes of issuing these ratings.

Moody's adopts all necessary measures so that the information it uses in assigning the ratings is of sufficient quality and from sources Moody's considers to be reliable including, when appropriate, independent third-party sources. However, Moody's is not an auditor and cannot in every instance independently verify or validate information received in the rating process.

Moody's Investors Service may have provided Ancillary or Other Permissible Service(s) to the rated entities or their related third parties within the two years preceding the credit rating action. Please see the special report "Ancillary or other permissible services provided to entities rated by MIS's EU credit rating agencies" on the ratings disclosure page on our website www.moodys.com for further information.

In addition to the information provided below please find on the ratings tab of the issuer page at www.moodys.com, for each of the ratings covered, Moody's disclosures on the lead rating analyst and the Moody's legal entity that has issued each of the ratings.

Please see the ratings disclosure page on www.moodys.com for general disclosure on potential conflicts of interests.

Please see the ratings disclosure page on www.moodys.com for information on (A) MCO's major shareholders (above 5%) and for (B) further information regarding certain affiliations that may exist between directors of MCO and rated entities as well as (C) the names of entities that hold ratings from MIS that have also publicly reported to the SEC an ownership interest in MCO of more than 5%. A member of the board of directors of this rated entity may also be a member of the board of directors of a shareholder of Moody's Corporation; however, Moody's has not independently verified this matter.

Please see Moody's Rating Symbols and Definitions on the Rating Process page on www.moodys.com for further information on the meaning of each rating category and the definition of default and recovery.

Please see ratings tab on the issuer/entity page on www.moodys.com for the last rating action and the rating history.

The date on which some ratings were first released goes back to a time before Moody's ratings were fully digitized and accurate data may not be available. Consequently, Moody's provides a date that it believes is the most reliable and accurate based on the information that is available to it. Please see the ratings disclosure page on our website www.moodys.com for further information.

Please see www.moodys.com for any updates on changes to the lead rating analyst and to the Moody's legal entity that has issued the rating.

Maria Jose Mori Vice President - Senior Analyst Financial Institutions Group Moody's Investors Service Espana, S.A. Calle Principe de Vergara, 131, 6 Planta Madrid 28002 Spain JOURNALISTS: 44 20 7772 5456 SUBSCRIBERS: 44 20 7772 5454 Johannes Wassenberg MD - Banking Financial Institutions Group JOURNALISTS: 44 20 7772 5456 SUBSCRIBERS: 44 20 7772 5454 Releasing Office: Moody's Investors Service Espana, S.A. Calle Principe de Vergara, 131, 6 Planta Madrid 28002 Spain JOURNALISTS: 44 20 7772 5456 SUBSCRIBERS: 44 20 7772 5454 (C) 2012 Moody's Investors Service, Inc. and/or its licensors and affiliates (collectively, "MOODY'S"). All rights reserved.

CREDIT RATINGS ISSUED BY MOODY'S INVESTORS SERVICE, INC. ("MIS") AND ITS AFFILIATES ARE MOODY'S CURRENT OPINIONS OF THE RELATIVE FUTURE CREDIT RISK OF ENTITIES, CREDIT COMMITMENTS, OR DEBT OR DEBT-LIKE SECURITIES, AND CREDIT RATINGS AND RESEARCH PUBLICATIONS PUBLISHED BY MOODY'S ("MOODY'S PUBLICATIONS") MAY INCLUDE MOODY'S CURRENT OPINIONS OF THE RELATIVE FUTURE CREDIT RISK OF ENTITIES, CREDIT COMMITMENTS, OR DEBT OR DEBT-LIKE SECURITIES. MOODY'S DEFINES CREDIT RISK AS THE RISK THAT AN ENTITY MAY NOT MEET ITS CONTRACTUAL, FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS AS THEY COME DUE AND ANY ESTIMATED FINANCIAL LOSS IN THE EVENT OF DEFAULT. CREDIT RATINGS DO NOT ADDRESS ANY OTHER RISK, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO: LIQUIDITY RISK, MARKET VALUE RISK, OR PRICE VOLATILITY. CREDIT RATINGS AND MOODY'S OPINIONS INCLUDED IN MOODY'S PUBLICATIONS ARE NOT STATEMENTS OF CURRENT OR HISTORICAL FACT. CREDIT RATINGS AND MOODY'S PUBLICATIONS DO NOT CONSTITUTE OR PROVIDE INVESTMENT OR FINANCIAL ADVICE, AND CREDIT RATINGS AND MOODY'S PUBLICATIONS ARE NOT AND DO NOT PROVIDE RECOMMENDATIONS TO PURCHASE, SELL, OR HOLD PARTICULAR SECURITIES. NEITHER CREDIT RATINGS NOR MOODY'S PUBLICATIONS COMMENT ON THE SUITABILITY OF AN INVESTMENT FOR ANY PARTICULAR INVESTOR. MOODY'S ISSUES ITS CREDIT RATINGS AND PUBLISHES MOODY'S PUBLICATIONS WITH THE EXPECTATION AND UNDERSTANDING THAT EACH INVESTOR WILL MAKE ITS OWN STUDY AND EVALUATION OF EACH SECURITY THAT IS UNDER CONSIDERATION FOR PURCHASE, HOLDING, OR SALE.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS PROTECTED BY LAW, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO, COPYRIGHT LAW, AND NONE OF SUCH INFORMATION MAY BE COPIED OR OTHERWISE REPRODUCED, REPACKAGED, FURTHER TRANSMITTED, TRANSFERRED,DISSEMINATED, REDISTRIBUTED OR RESOLD, OR STORED FOR SUBSEQUENT USE FOR ANY SUCH PURPOSE, IN WHOLE OR IN PART, IN ANY FORM OR MANNER OR BY ANY MEANS WHATSOEVER, BY ANY PERSON WITHOUT MOODY'S PRIOR WRITTEN CONSENT.

All information contained herein is obtained by MOODY'S from sources believed by it to be accurate and reliable. Because of the possibility of human or mechanical error as well as other factors, however, all information contained herein is provided "AS IS" without warranty of any kind. MOODY'S adopts all necessary measures so that the information it uses in assigning a credit rating is of sufficient quality and from sources MOODY'S considers to be reliable including, when appropriate, independent third-party sources. However, MOODY'S is not an auditor and cannot in every instance independently verify or validate information received in the rating process. Under no circumstances shall MOODY'S have any liability to any person or entity for (a) any loss or damage in whole or in part caused by, resulting from, or relating to, any error negligent or otherwise or other circumstance or contingency within or outside the control of MOODY'S or any of its directors, officers, employees or agents in connection with the procurement, collection, compilation, analysis, interpretation, communication, publication or delivery of any such information, or (b) any direct, indirect, special, consequential, compensatory or incidental damages whatsoever (including without limitation, lost profits), even if MOODY'S is advised in advance of the possibility of such damages, resulting from the use of or inability to use, any such information. The ratings, financial reporting analysis, projections, and other observations, if any, constituting part of the information contained herein are, and must be construed solely as, statements of opinion and not statements of fact or recommendations to purchase, sell or hold any securities. Each user of the information contained herein must make its own study and evaluation of each security it may consider purchasing, holding or selling.

NO WARRANTY, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, AS TO THE ACCURACY, TIMELINESS, COMPLETENESS, MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR ANY PARTICULAR PURPOSE OF ANY SUCH RATING OR OTHER OPINION OR INFORMATION IS GIVEN OR MADE BY MOODY'S IN ANY FORM OR MANNER WHATSOEVER.

MIS, a wholly-owned credit rating agency subsidiary of Moody's Corporation ("MCO"), hereby discloses that most issuers of debt securities (including corporate and municipal bonds, debentures, notes and commercial paper) and preferred stock rated by MIS have, prior to assignment of any rating, agreed to pay to MIS for appraisal and rating services rendered by it fees ranging from $1,500 to approximately $2,500,000. MCO and MIS also maintain policies and procedures to address the independence of MIS's ratings and rating processes. Information regarding certain affiliations that may exist between directors of MCO and rated entities, and between entities who hold ratings from MIS and have also publicly reported to the SEC an ownership interest in MCO of more than 5%, is posted annually at www.moodys.com under the heading "Shareholder Relations -- Corporate Governance -- Director and Shareholder Affiliation Policy."

Any publication into Australia of this document is by MOODY'S affiliate, Moody's Investors Service Pty Limited ABN 61 003 399 657, which holds Australian Financial Services License no. 336969. This document is intended to be provided only to "wholesale clients" within the meaning of section 761G of the Corporations Act 2001. By continuing to access this document from within Australia, you represent to MOODY'S that you are, or are accessing the document as a representative of, a "wholesale client" and that neither you nor the entity you represent will directly or indirectly disseminate this document or its contents to "retail clients" within the meaning of section 761G of the Corporations Act 2001.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, credit ratings assigned on and after October 1, 2010 by Moody's Japan K.K. ("MJKK") are MJKK's current opinions of the relative future credit risk of entities, credit commitments, or debt or debt-like securities. In such a case, "MIS" in the foregoing statements shall be deemed to be replaced with "MJKK". MJKK is a wholly-owned credit rating agency subsidiary of Moody's Group Japan G.K., which is wholly owned by Moody's Overseas Holdings Inc., a wholly-owned subsidiary of MCO.

This credit rating is an opinion as to the creditworthiness or a debt obligation of the issuer, not on the equity securities of the issuer or any form of security that is available to retail investors. It would be dangerous for retail investors to make any investment decision based on this credit rating. If in doubt you should contact your financial or other professional adviser.
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